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If It Looks Like a Duck ....
Traditional Public Forum Status of
Open Areas on Public University Campuses
by NATHAN W. KELLUM'
I. Introduction
As the oft-used and oft-quoted maxim for assessing the obvious
goes: "If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a
duck, it just may be a duck."2 The notion behind this quote is an
irrefutable adage, but one that is seemingly lost on many public
university administrators today who struggle to either discern or
acknowledge the obvious, that being, the traditional public forum
status of open areas on campus.
This difficulty with the obvious comes at a high cost. Would-be
speakers, both students and non-students alike, are deprived of
fundamental First Amendment freedoms in areas that represent
traditional public fora on campus. In essence, these universities set
themselves up as speech dictators, granting preferential treatment to
state-sanctioned speech, while severely restricting out-of-favor
expression in areas that would otherwise be suitable for speech
purposes. Although public universities that engage in such efforts are
rather diverse in their respective creations of policies pertaining to
speech, these universities are remarkably uniform in exercising
control over speech on campus. University administrators claim
speech on campus to be subject to their ownership of the property,
and with this self-professed authority, what they say goes, all under
the guise of so-called "reasonable" speech restrictions.3  Permit
requirements are routine,' as are ad hoc decisions about the propriety
1. Senior Legal Counsel, Alliance Defense Fund. Mr. Kellum wishes to thank Jon
Scruggs for his invaluable contribution to this article.
2. This is a quote attributed to Walter Reuther, a labor leader in the 1930s, on how
to spot a communist.
3. The "reasonableness" standard is a test that applies in nonpublic fora, a relatively low
standard to meet. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,682-83 (1998).
4. For example, University of Arkansas at Fayetteville mandates prior permission to speak
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of speech.' Speech zones are commonly enforced, requiring certain
speakers to express their message on undesirable portions of the
campus.6 And, in some instances, the right to speak on campus is
jettisoned altogether.7
Notwithstanding this common stance and the arrogance by which
it is communicated, the position adopted by many public universities
today runs afoul of well-established First Amendment principles.
Speech in a traditional public forum is supposed to receive the utmost
constitutional protection,8 whether the expression is found off campus
or on it. Unless a given public university can demonstrate sufficient
reason why open areas on campus should not fall under this
classification, the traditional public fora standard controls the analysis
and the level of protection afforded the speech.9
However, at the present time, there is a surprising dearth of
direct precedent on this issue. 0 Conveniently filling the void,
on campus grounds. Non-university entities are required to obtain permission no less than three
days prior to speaking, and only five such reservations may be made each semester. The
university expressly reserves the right to disapprove the request of any entity failing to comply
with university policy, or state or federal law. Fayetteville Policies and Procedures, 708.0,
available at http://www.uark.edu/admin/vcfainfo/policyprocedures/7080.pdf.
5. Typically, this involves university officials utilizing discretion in deciding whether
certain speech is appropriate on campus. See, e.g., Pro-Life Cougars v. Univ. of Houston,
259 F. Supp. 2d 575, 585 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
6. Speech zones concern arbitrary decisions about where speech can be conveyed on
a college campus. E.g., Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 864 (N.D. Tex. 2004)
(speech zone at Texas Tech University). See Derek P. Langhauser, Free and Regulated
Speech on Campus: Using Forum Analysis for Assessing Facility Use, Speech Zones, and
Related Expressive Activity, 31 J.C. & U.L. 481, 481 n. 2 (2005) (discussing challenges to
"speech zones" at various institutions); see generally Thomas J. Davis, Note, Assessing
Constitutional Challenges to University Free Speech Zones Under Public Forum Doctrine,
79 IND. L. J. 267 (2004) (addressing constitutional parameters of "speech zones" on
college campuses).
7. This is precisely how the University of Texas at Arlington treats speakers outside of their
college community. Bourgault v. Yudof, 316 F. Supp. 2d 411,413-14 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
8. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
9. The level of protection given to expression in this type of forum is significant. In a
traditional public forum, any restriction on speech must be content-neutral, narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels of expression, to survive scrutiny. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
10. Until recently, no appellate court had ever directly dealt with this issue. While
this author was in the process of completing this article, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals rendered its decision in ACLU v. Mote, 423 F.3d 438 (4th Cir. 2005), in which,
the appellate court held outdoor areas on College Park campus at the University of
Maryland not to be traditional public fora. Id. at 444. The precedential value of this
decision is questionable however. The analysis provided in Mote is regrettably shallow
and appears to be fact-specific. Nevertheless, as demonstrated herein, the ruling deviates
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university officials promulgate their own rule of law, an arbitrary
system that pays little attention to free speech concerns. For reasons
described more fully herein, this article will demonstrate the error of
the typical university mindset, highlighting the Supreme Court and
pertinent appellate court rulings that flatly contradict the commonly
held position regarding speech on university campuses. In the
absence of a Supreme Court ruling directly on point," this precedent
is gleaned from a variety of sources that are to be read as a whole.12
Much like a jigsaw puzzle, individual case holdings provide little
meaning, but taken as a whole, unmistakable legal precedent paints a
clear picture and points to the undeniable conclusion that open areas
on a public university campus classify as traditional public fora.
We will endeavor, in this article, to put the pieces together. For
once prevailing authority is properly recognized, speech on campus
should finally receive the constitutional protection it so richly
deserves.
II. Benefits of Being Traditional
The extent to which protected speech can be validly regulated
depends in large part on the forum employed and its classification.3
In a "traditional public forum," speakers enjoy the highest level of
constitutional protection. 4 Under this classification, restrictions on
speech are subject to a higher standard than that imposed in either a
limited public forum or a nonpublic forum.15 The traditional public
forum and all of forum analysis had its inception in 1939, in the case
from Supreme Court holdings and current trends among other appellate circuits.
11. To date, there is no Supreme Court ruling analyzing the issue described herein.
Even decisions in lower courts are sparse. In fact, aside from the recent holding of Mote,
there is only one reported decision, Bourgault, supra, that addresses the matter. And the
Bourgault ruling is prone to modification as an appeal is pending.
12. The precedent is primarily derived from the Supreme Court, but relevant
appellate court rulings provide needed clarification on the matter.
13. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 479 (1988). In Frisby, groups of eleven to forty
individuals picketed the residence of a local abortion doctor on six different occasions, for
periods of time ranging from one to one and a half hours. The picketing was peaceful and
orderly; the city had no occasion to invoke any existing ordinance concerning noise or
disorderly conduct. Id. at 476-77. The town then enacted a new ordinance prohibiting all
picketing in residential neighborhoods, except for labor picketing. After being advised by
an attorney that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection clause, the town enacted a
flat ban on all picketing in residential neighborhoods. Id. at 477. The Supreme Court held
the streets in question to be traditional public fora, and the ban content-neutral. Id. at
487-88.
14. Indeed, "almost unfettered access." Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679.
15. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001).
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of Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,16 when the United
States Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance that made the
leasing of public property contingent on police commissioner
approval.1 7 Speaking for the majority, Justice Butler declared that
"[w]herever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time
out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of
citizens.""8
From this rather vague verbiage, the Supreme Court constructed
modern categories of forum analysis, many years later, in Perry
Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n 9 In Perry, the Court
ruled that the government could bar a union from accessing an inter-
school mail system on the general basis that the "right of access to
public property and the standard by which limitations upon such a
right must be evaluated differ depending on the character of the
property at issue.' 2° Thereby, the Supreme Court tied the allowance of
free speech to the location or "forum" where the speech occurs, 2' and
proceeded to enumerate three types of governmentally-owned fora: 1)
traditional public forum which "by long tradition or by government
fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate;" 2) designated public
forum which "the State has opened for use by the public as a place for
expressive activity;"'  and 3) nonpublic forum "which is not by
tradition or designation a forum for public communication."'2 Though
labels, these characterizations prove vitally important in current
jurisprudence because governmental regulations impacting speech are
scrutinized in strict accordance with these forum categories. 2
16. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
17. Id. at 515-16. The unfettered discretion employed by the police commissioner
resulted in the prevention of distribution of pamphlets on city streets. Id. at 516.
18. Id. at 515.
19. 460 U.S. at 44-45. For an extensive discussion of public forum doctrine, including
its history and development, see generally Calvin Massey, Public Fora, Neutral
Governments, and the Prism of Property, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 309 (1999).
20. Perry, 460 U.S. at 44 (emphasis added).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 45.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 46.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 728-29 (1990) (plurality)
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In a traditional public forum,26 often exemplified by streets,
sidewalks, and parks, speech receives the "greatest degree of
protection. 2 7 These areas are considered "quintessential" fora for
expression.28 As such, a governmental entity's capacity to limit
expression is subjected to the utmost scrutiny;" in fact, in such areas,
"the government may not prohibit all communicative activity.
30
Moreover, in a traditional public forum, the exclusion of a speaker
premised on content must "serve a compelling state interest" and be
"narrowly drawn to achieve that end., 31 A governmental entity can
restrict speech in a traditional public forum pertaining to "regulations
of the time, place, and manner of expression."32 But even these
regulations must be 1) content-neutral,33 2) narrowly tailored to serve
(sidewalk's status as nonpublic forum served to validate restriction on solicitation);
Families Achieving Independence & Respect (FAIR) v. Neb. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 111
F.3d 1408, 1418 (8th Cir. 1997) (court found lobby of social services office to be nonpublic
forum, and, therefore, held ban on advocacy groups permissible).
26. This category has also been referred to as "open public forum" by the Supreme
Court. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106. The import of this synonym has yet to be
fleshed out.
27. FAIR, 111 F.3d at 1418.
28. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 481. A traditional public forum has as a principle purpose the
"free exchange of ideas." Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800. See Steven G. Gey, Reopening the
Public Forum - From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1538-39 (1998)
(Professor Gey correctly observes that "every culture must have venues in which citizens
can confront each other's ideas and ways of thinking about the world. Without such a
place, a pluralistic culture inevitably becomes Balkanized .....
29. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 726.
30. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. With a street, sidewalk, or park, for example, the
government cannot prevent all expressive activity and limit those areas only to travelers or
joggers. See Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 651 (1981)
(street is "not only a necessary conduit in the daily affairs of a locality's citizens, but also a
place where people may enjoy the open air or the company of friends and neighbors in a
relaxed environment").
31. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. If a restriction on expression in a public forum is content-
based, an analysis known as strict scrutiny applies. Id. Typically, regulations that permit
the government to discriminate on the basis of content cannot be tolerated under the First
Amendment. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 118 (1991). The Supreme Court admonishes, "we presume that governmental
regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of
ideas than to encourage it. The interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a
democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship." Reno
v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (holding Communications Decency Act of 1996
unconstitutional).
32. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
33. Id. Whether a restriction is content-based or content-neutral is for the most part
manifest. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980) (law banning picketing while
making exception for labor picketing held unconstitutional as premised on content). The
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a significant government interest,"4 and 3) leave open ample
alternative channels of communication. 3  Hence, as demonstrated,
any type of content-based or even content-neutral regulation of
speech within the confines of a traditional public forum comes to a
court with a very difficult and high burden.
The second category of forum, the "designated" or "limited
public forum,' '36 shares many features of the traditional public forum.
Though "a State is not required to indefinitely retain the open
character" of a designated public forum, "as long as it does so it is
bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum.
Reasonable time, place, and manner regulations are permissible, and
a content-based prohibition must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a
compelling state interest. Essentially, the designated public forum
is an all-or-nothing venture. Once the government has opened an
area to public expression,38 the area becomes subject to same standard
inquiry boils down to whether "the government has adopted a regulation of speech
because of disagreement with the message it conveys." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
34. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. A law is "narrowly tailored" if it "eliminates no more than
the exact source of the evil it seeks to remedy." Frisby, 487 U.S. at 480.
35. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. One may not have her constitutional right to expression
infringed upon simply because she may exercise it elsewhere. Schneider v. State of N.J.,
308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939). The particular goals and needs of the expression in question may
dictate whether or not the proffered alternatives are, in fact, viable alternatives for speech.
See Mahoney v. Babbit, 105 F.3d 1452, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (held that government could
not choose what public forum speaker could use, noting "it cannot rightly be said that all
such forums are equal.").
36. The terminology attached to this category is subject to debate. See Chiu v. Plano
Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 340, 345-46 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Despite the acceptance of a
middle category between traditional and nonpublic forums, there is some confusion over
the terminology used to describe this category. Two terms - 'designated public forum' and
'limited public forum' - have been utilized by the Supreme Court, our sister circuits, and
this court, yet there has not been agreement on their meaning. Specifically, it has not been
clear whether the terms should be used interchangeably to describe the middle tier of
forum, or in fact described different types of forums subject to different levels of First
Amendment scrutiny.") The distinction between limited and designated public fora, if
any, is a detour we decline to take in this article. Despite the inconsistent use of the terms
in the lower courts, the Supreme Court employs these terms interchangeably and has
never indicated the existence of a fourth category. Compare Good News Club, 533 U.S. 98
(refers to intermediate category as "limited public forum") with Forbes, 523 U.S. 666
(refers to intermediate category as "designated public forum").
37. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
38. The second category of fora consists of public property which the state has
opened for use by the public as a place for expression. FAIR, 111 F.3d at 1418. To open a
forum, the access allowed must be "general" as opposed to "selective." Forbes, 523 U.S.
678-80. It takes more than isolated incidents of permitted expression to establish a forum.
Id.
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as a traditional public forum.39 Yet, in contrast to a traditional public
forum, the government may restrict a designated public forum to
certain types or a class of speakers. For example, the government can
open an auditorium and create a limited public forum for musical
performances, thereby legally excluding all other types of expressive
activity, such as debates and protests. ' With this freedom, however,
the government may not open the forum to a class of speakers and
then forbid speakers within that same class.
Finally, in a nonpublic forum, the government may act with the
most discretion. Besides "time, place, and manner regulations, the
State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes,
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is
reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because
public officials oppose the speaker's view., 42 Courts are much more
willing to defer to governmental decisions under this standard. Even
43so, in a nonpublic forum, the government does not have free reign.
In all forums of governmentally owned property, the government is
not permitted to regulate or discriminate on the basis of the speaker's
viewpoint." And any restriction affecting protected expression must,
at a bare minimum, be reasonable under the circumstances. 5
39. It is thus subject to the same high burden. See, e.g., Bach v. Sch. Bd. of Va. Beach,
139 F. Supp. 2d 738, 744 (E.D. Va. 2001) (school board by-law precluding "personal
attacks" deemed unconstitutional prior restraint in limited public forum).
40. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 n.7. ("A public forum may be created for a limited purpose
such as use by certain groups or for the discussion of certain subjects") (citations omitted).
See Church on the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273, 1278 (10th Cir. 1996) (held
proper for senior citizens' center to be open only for discussion of subjects of interest to
elderly).
41. See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (holding municipality,
having created limited public forum for theatrical productions, could not censor
controversial musical); Pfeifer v. City of West Allis, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1266 (E.D. Wis.
2000) (holding public library's policy of excluding conference room use for religious
meetings unconstitutional, given room's status as limited public forum for non-profit
organizations and community service).
42. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
43. The government does not possess "unfettered power to exclude any [speaker] it
wish[es]." Forbes, 523 U.S. at 681.
44. Viewpoint discrimination is flatly prohibited in any forum. When government
officials restrict access to a forum in a manner that discriminates against the speaker on
the basis of viewpoint, they are guilty of "discrimination that is impermissible regardless of
forum status." DeBoer v. Vill. of Oak Park, 267 F.3d 558, 567 (7th Cir. 2001).
45. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 682. Reasonableness, in this context, "must be assessed in the
light of the purpose of the forum and all surrounding circumstances." Cornelius, 473 U.S.
at 809. The standard is lax, and shows great deference to the government, but it "does not
mean that the government can restrict speech in whatever way it likes." Forbes, 523 U.S.
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As evinced by this brief introduction to the tripartite structure of
forum analysis, the depiction of "traditional public forum" carries
with it substantial benefits for would-be speakers. 6 As the Supreme
Court continues to elaborate on and clarify the make-up of traditional
as well as other types of fora, the significance of the classification
continues to increase.
IM. Depicting a Forum as Traditional
Given the protection afforded speech in traditional public fora,
and the deference afforded governmental entities in nonpublic fora,
any issue over the propriety of speech on governmentally owned
property most likely turns on whether the property qualifies as a
traditional public forum."7 Therefore, the definition of a traditional
public forum plays a large role in cases involving free speech in public
areas.
Following the dicta in Hague,48 lower courts invariably concur
that streets, sidewalks, and parks are traditional public fora.49 As
often quoted, "[w]herever the titles of streets and parks may rest, they
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and
time out of mind, have been used for the purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions."50 This general understanding pertaining to streets and like
at 681. See, e.g., Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2005) (singling out
individual for speech exclusion is "not reasonable" in nonpublic forum); Vasquez v.
Housing Auth. of City of El Paso, 271 F. 3d 198, 205-06 (5th Cir. 2001) (held ordinance
banning door-to-door political campaigning "not reasonable" when other individuals
permitted entry for "legitimate business purposes"); Tucker v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., 97 F.3d
1204, 1215 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that it was "not reasonable" to allow employees to post
materials around office on different subjects, and forbid only posting of religious
information and materials).
46. See Davis, supra note 6, at 276 ("If the college campus is a public forum, then the
speech zone regulations must comply with the requirements of the time, place or manner
test").
47. Compare Lederman v. U.S., 291 F.3d 36, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding sidewalk
adjacent to Capitol traditional public forum, and, thus, restrictions on demonstration
invalid) with Hawkins v. City & County of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 1999)
(holding city's ban on demonstrations at plaza of performing arts center valid restriction
due to plaza being nonpublic forum).
48. 307 U.S. 496.
49. E.g., Parks v. City of Columbus, 395 F.3d 643, 648 (6th Cir. 2005) (streets and
sidewalks); ACLU of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2003)
(pedestrian mall); Warren v. Fairfax County, 196 F.3d. 186, 194-96 (4th Cir. 1999) (lawn in
front of county building with sidewalks and park-like areas).
50. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515 (emphasis added). For this reason, streets, sidewalks, and
parks are considered "prototypical" examples of traditional public fora. Schneck v. Pro-
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venues "wherever" they may lie provides a bright line and workable
framework in which to set aside certain qualities that are
characteristic of a traditional public forum. But despite the existence
of this framework, courts tend to stray and appeal to various other
factors in weighing these matters, creating regrettable confusion and
inconsistency in the law.51
Although something beyond a shallow analysis of the precedent
is necessary, the Supreme Court does provide unmistakable guidance
for forum analysis, which should serve to clear up the confusion. This
guidance is derived primarily through the work of one Supreme Court
justice, Justice Kennedy, and from his product, a moderate consensus
in certain appellate courts has arisen as to which factors are relevant
and most important in defining a traditional public forum.
A. Presumptively Traditional Areas: Streets, Sidewalks, and Parks
While courts tend to access numerous factors in fleshing out the
parameters of forum analysis, there exists a singular bright line rule
that continues to add clarity and predictability to the analysis: Streets,
sidewalks, and parks are presumptively traditional public fora. 2
Precedent makes plain that such areas are to be considered
traditional public fora, and courts are properly hesitant to depart
from this well established pattern. 3 In this sense, areas possessing
general characteristics of streets, sidewalks, and parks present strong
indication that they are uniquely suitable for expressive purposes.
Indeed, the Supreme Court often considers streets, sidewalks,
and parks as traditional public fora, without further consideration. 4
Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 377 (1997). No "particularized inquiry" is required for
such areas. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 481.
51. Cf Chicago Acorn, SEIU Local No. 880 v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Auth.,
150 F.3d 695 (7th Cir. 1998) (considering a balance of interests, public thoroughfare status,
value as expressive locale, and government interest in commercial revenues); Int'l Society
for Krishna Consciousness v. N.J Sports & Exposition Auth., 691 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1982)
(considering dedication to recreational use and inconsistency between free speech and
governmental intent); Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation v. Faneuil Hall
Marketplace, 745 F. Supp. 65, 75-76 (D. Mass. 1990) (considering historic use and use as
pedestrian connection to purely public adjoining areas).
52. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 481 (analyzing fora classification of public street).
53. See, e.g., Comite Pro-Celebracion v. Claypool, 863 F. Supp. 682, 688 (N.D. I11.
1994) (park held to be traditional public forum despite government's intention for it to be
otherwise).
54. This has been true ever since the Hague decision and its specific mention of the
special characteristics of streets and parks. 307 U.S. at 515.
FALL 2005]
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In United States v. Grace,5 for instance, the Supreme Court upheld
the traditional public forum status of certain sidewalks located on the
exterior of the Supreme Court building.6 Rather than go into an in-
depth analysis about the nature and purpose of those sidewalks, the
Court noted "that 'public places' historically associated with the free
exercise of expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks,
are considered, without more, to be 'public forums.
''5 7
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network58
struck down the use of "floating buffer zones" to prevent abortion
protestors from addressing those entering abortion clinics. In so
ruling, the Court again relied on the general nature of these
presumptive areas, determining that "speech in public areas is at its
most protected on public sidewalks, a prototypical example of a
traditional public forum."'59
The Supreme Court, perhaps, made its most definitive statement
for the presumptive character of streets, sidewalks, and parks in
Frisby v. Schultz,' wherein the Court struck down a Wisconsin law
forbidding picketing on public streets in front of residences.61 In lieu
of assessing the individual nature and purpose of the residential street
in question, the Court relied purely on the general character of public
streets, holding:
No particularized inquiry into the precise nature of a specific
street is necessary; all public streets are held in the public trust
and are properly considered traditional public fora.
Accordingly, the streets of Brookfield are traditional public
fora. The residential character of those streets may well inform
the application of the relevant test, but it does not lead to a
different test; the antipicketing ordinance must be judged
against the stringent standards we have established for
restrictions on speech in traditional public fora.62
Appellate courts have followed suit and given similar recognition
to the presumptive character of public streets, sidewalks, and parks.63
55. 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
56. Id. at 180.
57. Id. at 177.
58. 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
59. Id. at 377.
60. 487 U.S. 474.
61. Id. at 487.
62. Id. at 481.
63. See, e.g., ACLU of Nev., 333 F.3d at 1099 ("[S]idewalks, streets, and parks
generally are considered, without more, to be public forums.") (citation and internal
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Regardless of their surroundings or particular nature, these venues
are acknowledged as prima facie traditional public fora.6
B. Emergence of Compatibility as a Factor
In addition to the long-standing principle pertaining to the
traditional status granted to streets, sidewalks, and parks, a parallel
principle has emerged regarding compatibility of speech in a given
public area. This principle was recognized in Greer v. Spock,65 a case
in which the Supreme Court bypassed the presumption given to
streets and sidewalks because of the unique circumstances attached to
a federal military institution.66  Therein, the Court analyzed a
regulation banning political speeches and demonstrations on the
military institution of Fort Dix.67 Even though civilians were free to
enter the area, the High Court did not deem the property effectively
"open" since the commanding officer had "unquestioned power" to
exclude civilians from the area at any moment.68 Because military
quotation marks omitted); First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1129 ("[W]e do not believe
the special nature of this particular pedestrian passageway - that it traverses private
property rather than abuts a public street - defeats its status as a public forum. The
Supreme Court has made clear that once an 'archetype' of a public forum has been
identified, it is not appropriate to examine whether special circumstances would support
downgrading the property to a less protected forum."); Rappa v. New Castle County, 18
F.3d 1043, 1071 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Once it is determined that the forum at issue is public
roads, it is clear that it is a public forum."); Ater v. Armstrong, 961 F.2d 1224, 1227 (6th
Cir. 1992) ("There can be no doubt that the streets of Jefferson County, Kentucky, are
traditional public fora.").
64. The presumption attached to streets, sidewalks, and parks begs the question of
whether traditional public fora can exist outside of these specific venues. According to
Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court has "rejected the view that traditional public forum
status extends beyond its historic confines." Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679. But the meaning of
this is less than clear. It would seem that "historic confines" refer to certain
characteristics, not a limited set of forums. See generally Gey, supra note 28 (arguing that
traditional public forums should extend beyond sidewalks and parks to "metaphysical"
forums).
65. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
66. Id. at 837-38. The Court observed that a military installation is different. "The
notion that federal military reservations, like municipal streets and parks, have
traditionally served as a place for free public assembly and communication of thoughts by
private citizens is thus historically and constitutionally false." Id. at 838 (citation and
quotation omitted).
67. Id. at 831.
68. Id. at 838. In the ruling, the Supreme Court distinguished its earlier decision of
Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972). In Flower, the Court held that the military
had abandoned any claim that it had a special interest in the avenue in question, thus
making it no different than any other public street. 407 U.S. at 198. Greer, however, was
not a case where military authorities had abandoned claims of special interest in regulating
expression. 424 U.S. at 838. In fact, the record was in direct contraposition to such a
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installations, as a basic function, grant historical and unquestioned
control of the area to the commanding officer, the streets and
sidewalks found therein were not deemed public fora.69
Justice Powell, in his concurrence in Greer, best articulated the
guiding standard to determine traditional public forums, a standard
that lies in compatibility:
The Court is to inquire whether the manner of expression is
basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular
place at a particular time ... it is not sufficient that the area in
which the right of expression is sought to be exercised be
dedicated to some purpose other than use as a public forum, or
even that the primary business to be carried on in the area may
be disturbed by the unpopular viewpoint expressed. Our
inquiry must be more carefully addressed to the intrusion on
the specific activity involved and to the degree of infringement
on the First Amendment rights of the private parties. Some
basic incompatibility must be discerned between the
70communication and the primary activity of an area.
With this standard in tow, Justice Powell went on to assess the
special nature of the military and the possible ways that speech would
71interfere with the military's purpose.
Another important case in this line dealing with compatibility is
United States v. Kokinda.72 In Kokinda, police prevented volunteers
from soliciting contributions and distributing political information on
a public sidewalk leading up to a Maryland post office.73 The relevant
Maryland law forbade solicitations on postal premises.74  In a
fractured decision, a plurality consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and White, held that the way leading
to the entrance of the post office is a nonpublic forum and the
claim. Therefore, the Greer Court made manifest that Flower did not express any new
principles of freedom of speech on government property; it was, rather, a case of a
prototypical public street that was compatible with expression. 424 U.S. at 838.
69. Greer, 424 U.S. at 837-38.
70. Id. at 843 (Powell, J, concurring) (citation and quotation omitted).
71. Id. at 843-44. Conversely, if a particular venue is open and accessible and is
compatible with expression, such venue ought to be considered a traditional public forum.
Cf. Paulson v. County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding grounds outside
of coliseum to be public forum, appellate court distinguished Greer, determining that
expressive activities did not threaten same type of governmental function at coliseum as
that implicated on military base).
72. 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (plurality).
73. Id. at 723.
74. Id.
[Vol. 33:1
Maryland law a reasonable regulation." Contrariwise, Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun believed the sidewalk to
be a traditional public forum and the law not narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling government interest.76 As a decisive swing vote,
Justice Kennedy strongly implied that the path is a traditional public
forum, but proceeded to uphold the law as a valid time, place, or
manner restriction.77
In denying traditional forum status, the plurality refused to
conceive the sidewalk in question as being a classic public sidewalk.
To the contrary, the plurality held:
The right of access under consideration in this case [is not] the
quintessential public sidewalk which we addressed in Frisby v.
Schultz. The postal sidewalk was constructed solely to assist
postal patrons to negotiate the space between the parking lot
and the front door of the post office, not to facilitate the daily
commerce and life of the neighborhood or city.
78
The Kokinda plurality premised its reasoning on the holding in
Greer finding a street open to the public within the confines of a
military base not to be a traditional public forum.79justice O'Conner,
author of the opinion, summarized that "the location and purpose of
a publicly owned sidewalk is critical to determining whether such a
sidewalk constitutes a public forum."8  Taken in isolation, thus,
Kokinda would seem to undermine the existence of any presumption
regarding public sidewalks and likewise streets and parks.
Two considerations, however, rebuff this hasty generalization.
First, a majority of justices in Kokinda actually ruled the sidewalk in
question to be, in fact, a traditional public forum.8" The dissenting
justices explicitly rejected any reasoning that would require an
analysis of a specific type of sidewalk. Instead, the dissent considered
critical the fact "that the walkway at issue is a sidewalk open and
accessible to the general public is alone sufficient to identify it as a
75. Id. at 730, 737.
76. Id. at 740, 755 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 737-39 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 727-28 (citation omitted).
79. Id. at 728-29.
80. Id.
81. See Lederman v. U.S., 291 F. 3d 36, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("only four Justices [in
Kokinda] agreed with the government that the sidewalk in question was a nonpublic
forum").
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public forum." ' Furthermore, these four justices proceeded to deny
any basis for the type of analysis undertaken by the plurality since
"[t]he cases that formed the foundation of public forum doctrine did
not engage in the type of fact-specific inquiry undertaken by the
plurality today. 83  Similarly, Justice Kennedy, as the decisive
member, ' implicitly determined the sidewalk to be a traditional
public forum. Though he did not explicitly label the sidewalk, Justice
Kennedy did note:
The public's use of postal property for communicative purposes
means that the surrounding walkways may be an appropriate
place for the exercise of vital rights of expression.... It is true
that the uses of the adjacent public buildings and the needs of
its patrons are an important part of a balance, but there remains
a powerful argument that, because of the wide range of
activities that the Government permits to take place on this
postal sidewalk, it is more than a nonpublic forum.
In light of the uneven nature of the Court in this decision, and the
comments of Justice Kennedy, if anything, Kokinda stands for the
minimal universal principle that sidewalks remain prototypical public
fora.86
Secondly, even if the Kokinda plurality could serve as limited
precedent, that precedent supports the theory espoused heretofore,
namely, that streets, sidewalks, and parks are presumptively
traditional public foray8 The Kokinda plurality never denied the fact
that sidewalks and streets are generally considered traditional public
fora. Instead, the plurality differentiated the sidewalk under
consideration from classic examples of sidewalks and proceeded to
82. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 745 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 746 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. See First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City, 308 F. 3d 1114, 1125 n.6 (10th Cir.
2002) ("We cite Justice Kennedy's concurrence [in Kokinda] as controlling Supreme
Court precedent because his concurrence provided the fifth vote on the narrowest
grounds").
85. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 737 (Kennedy, J., concurring). This reading of Kokinda is
further buttressed by Justice Kennedy's use of time, place, and manner analysis. Id. Such
standard is only appropriate for public forums.
86. The only logical way to interpret the phrase "more than a nonpublic forum" is
that the area is public fora. It has to be one or the other. See also Ken Kimura, A
Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of Plurality Decisions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1593,
1618-19 (1992) (using Kokinda to illustrate fair interpretation of plurality decision).
87. Accord Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1071 n.49 (3d Cir. 1994)
(acknowledging that Kokinda does not undercut general presumption that public
sidewalks and roads are traditional public fora).
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analyze the location and purpose of the particular sidewalk.'
In fact, in the balance, the only consistent way to reconcile
Kokinda with other Supreme Court precedent is to acknowledge a
rebuttable presumption granted to a forum with objective
characteristics of a street, sidewalk, or park. Per discussion supra,
streets, sidewalks, and parks "without more" are traditional public
fora.89  Reading the precedents together, and consistently,
incompatibility with expression constitutes the "more" that must be
shown to rebut the presumption. This understanding best reconciles
various factors and values involved in forum analysis. Lower courts,
the government as property owner, and speakers all, benefit from
clear rules, and a presumption premised on objective characteristics
provides much needed predictability and clarity in the analysis. Yet
still, such presumption gives courts sufficient flexibility to apply
forum analysis to specific and different cases. The coupling of clarity
and flexibility, in turn, ensures greater accuracy in achieving an
optimum balance of the competing values at stake.
Perhaps, the clearest exposition of an objective compatibility
approach comes from Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee. 9°In the
concurrence, Justice Kennedy reflects: "In my view, the inquiry must
be an objective one, based on the actual, physical characteristics and
uses of the property. The fact that in our public forum cases we
discuss and analyze these precise characteristics tends to support my
position. ' Justice Kennedy proceeds to lay out his proposal for an
objective forum analysis methodology:
If the objective, physical characteristics of the property at issue
and the actual public access and uses that have been permitted
by the government indicate that expressive activity would be
88. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730.
89. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177.
90. 505 U.S. 672 (1992). In Lee, a religious group challenged a ban on solicitation in
an airport. Id. at 683. The Court, in a plurality decision, upheld the restriction as
reasonable, judging the airport terminal to be a nonpublic forum. Id. The shallow analysis
set forth by the plurality in reaching this conclusion generated an immediate firestorm of
scholarly criticism. See generally R. Alexander Acosta, Revealing the Inadequacy of the
Public Forum Doctrine: International Society of Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S.
Ct. 2701 (1992), 16 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 269 (1993); Stephen K. Shultz, International
Society of Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee: The Public Forum Doctrine Falls to
Government Intent Standard, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 563 (1993); David A. Stoll,
Public Forum Doctrine Crashes at Kennedy Airport, Injury Nine: International Society of
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1271 (1993).
91. Lee, 505 U.S. at 695 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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appropriate and compatible with those uses, the property is a
public forum. The most important considerations in this
analysis are whether the property shares physical similarities
with more traditional public forums, whether the government
has permitted or acquiesced in broad public access to the
property, and whether expressive activity would tend to
interfere in a significant way with the uses to which the
government has as a factual matter dedicated the property. In
conducting the last inquiry, courts must consider the
consistency of those uses with expressive activities in general,
rather than the specific sort of speech at issue in the case before
it; otherwise the analysis would be one not of classification but
rather of case-by-case balancing, and would provide little
guidance to the State regarding its discretion to regulate speech.
Courts must also consider the availability of reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions in undertaking this compatibility
analysis.9'
In recap, Justice Kennedy, effectively speaking for the Supreme
Court as a whole, articulates three prongs for defining a traditional
public forum: 1) physical similarities with streets, parks, and sidewalks
2) open public access; and 3) compatibility of expression with the
objective use of the property. The Supreme Court has effectively
embraced this objective approach. 9
C. Working it Out in the Circuits: Following the Kennedy Compatibility
Trail
Noting the Supreme Court's reliance on objective and
compatibility factors, several circuit courts have begun to exercise
these criteria for forum analysis, adopting the reasoning illuminated
92. Id. at 698-699. Recognizing the influence of Justice Kennedy, this standard set out
in the Lee concurrence was adopted in toto by the Tenth Circuit. First Unitarian Church,
308 F.3d at 1125. Commentators also appear to approve of Justice Kennedy's logic and
acknowledge its weight. E.g., Gey, supra note 28 (drawing on Kennedy's remarks, argues
that First Amendment protects speech in public place unless speech would significantly
interfere with government's non-communicative activities in that space).
93. See, e.g., Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677 ("Traditional public fora are defined by the
objective characteristics of the property...") (citation and quotation omitted). One
commentator suggests that Justice Kennedy abandoned his compatibility approach and
adopted a governmental intent standard when he wrote the Forbes decision. See David S.
Day, The Public Forum Doctrine's "Government Intent Standard": What Happened to
Justice Kennedy?, 2000 L. REV. MICH. ST. UNIV. DET. C. L. 173 (2000). But this author
fails to see any deviation in Kennedy's approach. Justice Kennedy, ruling with the
majority in Forbes, analyzed a forum that was plainly not a traditional public forum, thus
governmental intention became an appropriate consideration. In so doing, however,
Kennedy specifically mentions in dicta that traditional public fora are to be judged by
objective characteristics. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677.
[Vol. 33:1
by Justice Kennedy. These appellate courts have taken to heart the
Supreme Court's admonitions, combining an analysis of the physical
characteristics and a general standard assessing whether speech is
compatible with the purpose of the property, in classifying the forum
status of public property.94
1. D C. Circuit
For example, the District of Columbia Circuit appears to lean
toward a more objective approach in judging traditional public fora.
In Henderson v. Lujan,95 an evangelist was prevented from
distributing information on city sidewalks near the Vietnam Veterans
Memorial wall.96 In assessing the matter, the appellate court relied
heavily on the fact that the sidewalks in question are physically
similar to an ordinary sidewalk: "The two sidewalks here appear to be
classic instances. They are physically indistinguishable from ordinary
sidewalks used for the full gamut of urban walking. They are used by
thousands of pedestrians every year, including not only Memorial
visitors but also people going to other places.':
The D.C. Circuit continued toward a more functional definition
of a traditional public forum in Lederman v. United States. 98 There,
the government arrested individuals for distributing leaflets in a "no-
demonstration zone" on the sidewalk at the foot of the Senate steps
near the Capitol Building. 99 The appellate court upheld the sidewalk
as a traditional public forum."° The upshot of the Court's decision
reveals that it did not consider the intention of government in its
reasoning, but looked to the purpose and function of the sidewalk in
question: "In short, although the East Front sidewalk borders no
public streets, it is continually open, often uncongested, and
constitutes not only a necessary conduit in the daily affairs of [the
city's] citizens, but also a place where people may enjoy the open air
or the company of friends and neighbors, and a place from which
tourists may view and photograph the Capitol. Under these
circumstances, we agree with the district court that, like the rest of the
94. Thus, rejecting the subjective government intent standard for judging public fora.
95. 964 F.2d 1179 (D.C. Cir 1992).
96. Id. at 1180-81.
97. Id. at 1182.
98. 291 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
99. Id. at 40.
100. Id. at 41-44.
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Capitol Grounds, the sidewalk is a traditional public forum."' ' With
this ruling, the Lederman court makes clear that mere notice did not
prove decisive in its ruling because the sidewalk under consideration
was not near any other public sidewalk.'9 Instead, the D.C. Circuit
compared a public sidewalk to the sidewalk at the Capitol in terms of
certain objective characteristics, thereby concluding the latter a
traditional public forum.' °3 Thus, the language of the D.C. Circuit's
decisions focuses on purpose, physical characteristics, and
compatibility with speech, and so implies a move away from any
reliance on governmental intention."
2. First Circuit
The very nature of most sidewalks and streets allows courts to
presume that these areas are traditional public fora. Importantly, the
First Circuit, in New England Regional Council of Carpenters v.
Kinton,05 explicitly recognized this jurisprudential understanding of
the precedents."° In this matter, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit ruled a pier with restaurants and interior walkways not a
traditional public forum and thus the government could prevent the
distribution of information thereon."° Wrestling with the nature of
the sidewalks located within the pier, the Kinton court relied
explicitly on the presumptive nature of sidewalks and on the
possibility of rebutting that presumption, as established by Kokinda:
Some spaces - such as public streets, sidewalks, and parks - are
presumptively public fora, and in most cases no particularized
inquiry into their precise nature is necessary. We say "most"
rather than "all" because this presumption can be rebutted in
specific instances. The problem of classification grows
increasingly difficult in instances in which no presumption is
available, and categorical distinctions are of little help in
borderline cases. In the end, an inquiring court must examine
the nature of the locus, as well as its history, to determine
101. Id. at 44 (quotation and citation omitted).
102. Id. at 39. This is significant because a couple of circuits seem to incorporate
notice as a factor in the process. See discussion infra at note 126.
103. Id. at 41-44.
104. An important distinction, signaling a reliance on the Kennedy concurrence, rather
than the plurality, in Kokinda.
105. 284 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2002).
106. Id. at 20-21.
107. Id. at 22-29. In Kinton, the First Circuit reviewed the propriety of a ban on
leafleting on a multi-purpose pier and permit requirement for public ways in the area. Id.
at 15-17.
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whether it qualifies as a traditional public forum'
As articulated by the First Circuit, the guiding basis for forum
analysis must involve the property's nature.
3. Ninth Circuit
At one time, in the not so distant past, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals utilized an analysis that looked to government intent to
define a traditional public forum." 9 More recently, however, the
Ninth Circuit repudiated its prior logic and substantially moved
toward an approach akin to that of Justice Kennedy's analysis in Lee
and Kokinda.
In ACLU of Nevada v. City of Las Vegas,"° Las Vegas turned
several blocks of a downtown street into a publicly-owned pedestrian
mall and placed substantial restrictions on expressive activity in the
mall."' The court ruled that the mall was a traditional public forum
by taking into account two general factors: "First, and most
significantly, there is a common concern for the compatibility of the
uses of the forum with expressive activity,"12 and then "[s]econdly,
the case law demonstrates a commitment by the courts to guarding
speakers' reasonable expectations that their speech will be
protected."..3 After announcing these general concerns, the appellate
court went on to lay out the three specific criteria adopted by the
Ninth Circuit: "1) the actual use and purposes of the property,
particularly status as a public thoroughfare and availability of free
public access to the area; 2) the area's physical characteristics,
including its location and the existence of clear boundaries delimiting
the area; and 3) traditional or historic use of both the property in
question and other similar properties."'" 14  Those factors emphasize
that a property's purpose must be assessed objectively rather than by
108. Id. at 20-21 (citations and parentheticals omitted).
109. See Jacobsen v. Bonine, 123 F.3d 1272, 1274 (9th Cir. 1997) (ruling that interstate
rest areas are not traditional public forums, court remarked "it is the location and purpose
of the property and the government's subjective intent in having the property built and
maintained, that is crucial to determining the nature of the property for forum analysis.")
(citations omitted).
110. 333 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2003).
111. Id. at 1094-95. Particularly, local ordinance limited leafleting and vending in the
mall area. Id.
112. Id. at 1100.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1100-01 (citations omitted).
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the intent of the government. Hence, the standards adopted by the
Ninth Circuit resemble those proposed by Justice Kennedy with a
focus on objective physical characteristics, objective purpose, physical
similarity, and compatibility with speech."5
4. Tenth Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has moved even
closer to Justice Kennedy's position than the other circuits. In Faustin
v. City and County of Denver, Colorado,"6 the appellate court
analyzed the right of an anti-abortion advocate to protest on a
highway overpass, and found the overpass to be a traditional public
forum.'17 Though the court's reasoning is brief, the opinion reflects
that the circumstance of the overpass "link[ing] the parallel sides of
the street to one another, acting as a thoroughfare between them
rather than providing access to a single remote location" proved
decisive. Again, as with the other circuits embracing this way of
forum analysis, the court reviewed certain objective characteristics of
the property rather than defer to a formal conception of tradition or
government intent.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals confirmed its acceptance of
objective characteristics in the more recent decision of First Unitarian
Church v. Salt Lake City."9 In this case, the city sold a portion of
downtown to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints but
retained an easement for public use.2 The First Unitarian Church,
among others, challenged the constitutionality of such a sale. 2'
Despite the fact that the sales contract explicitly denied the creation
of a public forum, the Tenth Circuit held that the easement was a
traditional public forum.'22 And, after explicitly denying that
115. Interestingly, the City of Las Vegas appealed this decision to the Supreme Court
but the Supreme Court denied the writ of certiorari with no dissenting opinion. City of
Las Vegas v. ACLU, 540 U.S. 1110 (2004). Such a denial may simply flow from an over-
crowded judicial docket, or the denial may represent a desire to see these issues develop
more thoroughly in the district and circuit level before tackling the issue, or, perhaps, it
may reflect full agreement with the Ninth Circuit.
116. 268 F.3d 942 (10 Cir. 2001).
117. Id. at 949-50.
118. Id. at 949.
119. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114
(10th Cir. 2002).
120. Id. at 1117-18.
121. Id. at 1119.
122. Id. at 1128.
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government intent controls forum analysis, the appellate court
specifically cites Justice Kennedy's proposed three-prong test and
notes that they "apply these factors to assess the easement's character
for First Amendment purposes."'23 Thus, the Tenth Circuit currently
employs a multi-factorial approach that includes the "actual purpose
and use of the easement," "whether speech activities are compatible
with the purpose of the easement," and finally "the history of the
property."'24 Hence, the Tenth Circuit formally adopts the blueprint
laid out by Justice Kennedy, focusing on objective characteristics and
compatibility rather than governmental intent.2
D. Articulating the Standard
As evidenced in the D.C., First, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, as a
growing trend, courts have turned to a presumptive objective-
oriented approach to depict a traditional public forum.' Yet, there is
123. Id. at 1125.
124. Id. at 1126-29. As with the ACLU of Nevada opinion in the Ninth Circuit, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari on this case. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v.
Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 1002), cert. denied, sub nom. Corp. of
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. First Unitarian Church,
539 U.S. 941 (2003). Thus, despite ample opportunity to do otherwise, the Supreme Court
has kept the objective-based analysis intact.
125. See generally Seth D. Rogers, Note, A Forum By Any Other Name. . .Would Be
Just As Confusing: The Tenth Circuit Dismisses Intent From The Public Forum. First
Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F. 3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2002), 4 WYO. L. REV.
753 (2004) (acknowledging and applauding the Tenth Circuit's rejection of governmental
intent standard in First Unitarian Church).
126. Three other circuits, the Fifth, the Sixth, and the Seventh, also bear mentioning.
Although they incorporate objective characteristics in their public fora analysis, and steer
away from governmental intent, these circuits take a different approach.
The appellate courts in the Fifth and Sixth circuits appear to include notice as a
factor in their reasoning. The case of Brister v. Faulkner, 214 F.3d 675, 678 (5"h Cir. 2000)
emanating from the Fifth Circuit, involved restriction on speech on a section of sidewalk
on a public university. Id. at 678. The Court of Appeals viewed the university sidewalk
indistinguishable from city sidewalks, and, as such, deemed the university sidewalk a
public forum. Id. at 682. The lack of notice of failing to inform someone that he was
entering into some special enclave controlled the analysis. Id. at 682-83 (citing United
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983)). Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
relied on objective notice of physical characteristics. United Church of Christ v. Gateway
Econ. Dev. Corp. of Greater Cleveland, Inc., 383 F.3d 449, 455 (6th Cir. 2004). In
Gateway, a religious organization wanted to demonstrate on sidewalks surrounding the
complex where local professional sports teams played. Id. at 451. The appellate court
held the privately-owned sidewalk to be a traditional public forum, because it "blends into
the urban grid, borders the road, and looks just like any public sidewalk." Id. at 452.
The Seventh Circuit appears to adopt a novel approach that is set apart from the
rest, premised on a cost-benefit analysis, as evidenced in the opinion of Chicago Acorn,
SEIU Local No. 880 v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Auth., 150 F.3d 695 (7th Cir.
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still much confusion over the relevance and priority of factors within
the approach itself.'27 For this reason, this section will enunciate a
standard that seeks to clarify the factors and their respective ordering.
This standard does not articulate a new test but rather seeks to
consolidate existing precedents that represent a growing and
undeniable trend toward a more reasoned, objective approach to
forum analysis. The proper standard has two prongs, each with
important subpoints: 1) the area must share characteristics of streets,
sidewalks, and parks and 2) expressive behavior must be compatible
with the objective purpose of the property in question.28 Putting it
succinctly, a traditional public forum is any parcel of governmental
property that allows for open public access and is compatible with
expressive activity.9  Per discussion herein, this standard is mandated
by precedent, as well as policy considerations.
1. Physical Characteristics
At the outset, it must be noted that the second prong (speech
compatibility with property) is the general guiding factor behind this
two-part test. In fact, as will be demonstrated, the policy
considerations behind compatibility underlie the very reason for
considering physical similarity in the first place. However, a pure
balancing test considering only compatibility does not adequately
reflect legal precedent nor does it provide sufficient guidance to lower
courts. Physical similarity presents an easily testable factor for lower
courts to apply, and for that reason, seems suitable as an independent
prong. As proven in the prior section, both Supreme Court and circuit
court jurisprudence contain a vital place for physical similarity. While
Kokinda plurality somewhat downplayed the importance of physical
1998). In Chicago Acorn, the government prevented individuals from marching,
protesting, or leafleting in a government-owned renovated naval pier containing
recreational and commercial facilities. Id. at 698-99. After noting that the sidewalks
within the pier area are not thoroughfares, Judge Posner, on behalf of the panel, went on
to note that, "Navy Piers, being classified as a public forum is also not indispensable to the
health of the market in ideas and opinions; there are plenty of other areas in Chicago for
demonstrations in support of a higher minimum wage or other political objectives." Id. at
703. Accordingly, the cost of preventing such speech on the pier was considered low given
the alternative locations. Id. Judge Posner, thus, compares the cost of preventing the
speech with the cost of allowing the speech. In the end, Judge Posner and the Seventh
Circuit, conclude that forcing free speech upon the area has the potential to discourage
government from investing and renovating property. Id.
127. See supra note 51.
128. The following discussion attempts to articulate and expound on this standard.
129. As so phrased, this is the precise standard for determining the existence of a
traditional public forum.
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similarities, it still analyzed those physical similarities, and no
Supreme Court decision has even branded an area as a traditional
public forum without those qualities.3'
A definitive statement on physical characteristics flows from the
case of Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness,3
where the Court judged a location hosting a state fair a public forum,
and thus, the government was not justified in setting strict
requirements for the expression of speech at the fair. 32 Therein, the
Court reassured that the archetypal public forum "is continually
open, often uncongested, and constitutes not only a necessary conduit
in the daily affairs of a locality's citizens, but also a place where
people may enjoy the open air or the company of friends and
neighbors in a relaxed environment.' '13  The Heffron Court stressed
three physical qualities as characteristic: 1) accessibility to the public
2) public thoroughfare (uncongested-ness and necessary conduit) and
3) open air.' " The Supreme Court has since either explicitly or
implicitly stressed these three factors in public forum analysis.'
33
These factors are appropriate for consideration because speech in an
area with these qualities is of great worth given the opportunity to
communicate with many people and the low possibility of the speech
interfering with other activities.
a. Openness to the public
The Supreme Court has clarified that openness to the public is a
critical factor to consider,'136 but the rationale for its importance has
130. And, as previously mentioned, Judge Kennedy's concurrence, which embraced
objective characteristics, best articulates the Kokinda ruling. See supra notes 81-86.
131. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
132. Id. at 651.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 650-51.
135. E.g. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 479-81 (1988); United States v. Grace, 461
U.S. 171, 177 (1983). Moreover, the Supreme Court recently referred to this category as
the "traditional or open public forum," Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S.
98, 106 (1992), signifying an inextricable link between openness and accessibility and this
particular category of forum.
136. See Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197, 198-99 (openness on public way on
military installation dictated finding of public forum). See also International Society for
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 697 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("In my
view the policies underlying the [forum analysis] doctrine cannot be given effect unless we
recognize that open, public spaces and thoroughfares that are suitable for discourse may
be public forums, whatever their historical pedigree and without concern for a precise
classification of the property."); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 47 (1983) ("If by policy or by practice the Perry School District has opened its
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been less than clear. A mere appeal to tradition in no way explains
the importance of openness. Tradition itself offers no reason and fails
to recognize the reality that those in the past maintained a rationale
for allowing speech in certain areas and not in others. The most
obvious rationale for the traditional importance of openness is that
speech in an area open to the public is more likely to be effective in
that it will reach numerous people. In contrast, in an area that is
closed to the public, a speaker will probably not reach as many
persons with his or her message. Thereby, the potential benefits of
speech in an open area are much greater than the potential benefits in
a closed area with respect to the potential dissemination effect. In the
same way, the potential costs of speech in a closed area are much
greater than those costs in an open area. Practically speaking, there is
probably a legitimate reason why the government has closed an area
to the public. Areas such as military bases, libraries, or hospital
emergency rooms could not ordinarily achieve their respective
purposes if protests and loud speech exists.37
b. Public Thoroughfare
A similar rationale applies to the importance of an area being a
public thoroughfare, or as the Heffron Court described, an area
"uncongested" and a "necessary conduit in the daily affairs of a
locality's citizens. 138 Like an area open to the public, a public
thoroughfare possesses qualities conducive for a speaker to
communicate a message effectively, and thus courts often consider
mail system for indiscriminate use by the general public, then PLEA could justifiably
argue a public forum has been created. This, however, is not the case. As the case comes
before us, there is no indication in the record that the school mailboxes and interschool
delivery system are open for use by the general public."); Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974) ("Here, we have no open spaces, no meeting hall, park,
street corner, or other public thoroughfare. Instead, the city is engaged in commerce. It
must provide rapid, convenient, pleasant, and inexpensive service to the commuters of
Shaker Heights. The car card space, although incidental to the provision of public
transportation, is a part of the commercial venture."); Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (noting that use not only of streets but also "public
places" have "from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and
liberties of citizens.").
137. "It is consequently the business of a military installation like Fort Dix to train
soldiers, not to provide a public forum." Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1981). "There
is nothing in the Constitution that disables a military commander from acting to avert
what he perceives to be a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops on the
base under his command." Id. at 840.
138. Heffron V. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. (1981) 651.
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this factor.'3 9 Because numerous people pass through a public
thoroughfare, a speaker can expose many different audiences to his
message without need of transport. The benefits of speech here are
great. Conversely, the potential costs of speech in the area are low.
Unlike areas that dead end or where people become stagnant and
overcrowded, a public thoroughfare would not lend itself to
disruptions or congestion.' The possibility for a disruption to break
out is low because if a passerby did not want to listen to the speaker
that passerby could easily avoid the speaker and continue on his or
her path.' Thus, the value of speech in a public thoroughfare is great
and the potential costs are minimal.
4
1
139. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 697-98 (Kennedy, J. concurring) ("[O]pen, public spaces and
thoroughfares that are suitable for discourse may be public forums, whatever their
historical pedigree and without concern for a precise classification of the property ....
Without this recognition our forum doctrine retains no relevance in times of fast-changing
technology and increasing insularity."); ACLU of Nev v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092,
1101 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Thus, when a property is used for open public access or as a public
thoroughfare, we need not expressly consider the compatibility of expressive activity
because these uses are inherently compatible with such activity... Use of a forum as a
public thoroughfare is often regarded as a key factor in determining public forum status");
First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1128 (10th
Cir. 2002) ("Expressive activities have historically been compatible with, if not virtually
inherent in, spaces dedicated to general pedestrian passage."); Faustin v. City and County
of Denver, Colorado, 268 F.3d 942, 949 (10th Cir. 2001) ("Here, the overpass does not
lead from a parking lot to the front door of a building, but enables pedestrian traffic to
cross over a highway. It links the parallel sides of the street to one another, acting as a
thoroughfare between them rather than providing access to a single remote location.");
Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. Local Joint Exec. Bd., 257 F.3d 937, 943 (9th Cir. 2001)
("This replacement sidewalk is a thoroughfare sidewalk, seamlessly connected to public
sidewalks on either end and intended for general public use."); Chicago Acorn, SEIU
Local No. 880 v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Auth., 150 F.3d 695, 702 (7th Cir. 1998)
(concluding that sidewalks at Navy Pier entertainment complex were not public forums
because they were not part of the city's automotive, pedestrian, or bicyclists'
transportation grid).
140. A "thoroughfare" is essentially a path that can lead from point A to point B, and
necessarily includes all streets, sidewalks, and ways.
141. See Lederman v. U.S., 291 F.3d 36, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("If people entering and
leaving the Capitol can avoid running headlong into tourists, joggers, dogs, and
strollers... then we assume they are also capable of circumnavigating the occasional
protester."). The existence of thoroughfare avoids concerns brought about by an
audience.
142. See also Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974) ("Here, we
have no open spaces, no meeting hall, park, street corner, or other public thoroughfare.
Instead, the city is engaged in commerce. It must provide rapid, convenient, pleasant, and
inexpensive service to the commuters of Shaker Heights. The car card space, although
incidental to the provision of public transportation, is a part of the commercial venture.").
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c. Open Air
Open air refers to the fact that an area is not contained within a
building. This is a factor explicitly mentioned by the Heffron Court as
a character trait of a traditional public forum.'43 The value of open air
stems from the same rationale that gives credence to public
thoroughfares or openness to the public. In an open-air area, the
probability is low that a speaker will substantially disrupt the
purposes of the area. Because of the open air, sound will easily
dissipate and thus open-air areas seem the most conducive to
demonstrations, protests, and loud speaking. The value of open air
could also explain the Lee decision that an airport is not a traditional
public forum.'" Clearly, the airport contains "public thoroughfares
full of people and lined with stores and other commercial activities"
and is "open to the public without restriction." 4' Yet, the fact that the
relevant areas are inside means that the possible disruption coming
from solicitation is more likely.' 6
143. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 651. However, at least one appellate court declines to
acknowledge this consideration. In fact, Judge Posner, speaking for the Seventh Circuit,
explicitly denies the importance of open air:
There is no relevant difference between the sidewalks on Navy Pier
and the public areas of the indoor shopping malls. Both types of
pathway are pedestrian walkways leading mainly to shops. The fact
that one type has a roof over it and the other does not cannot make as
large a difference as the district judge (who, remember, classified the
sidewalks as a traditional public forum and the interior walkways as a
totally nonpublic forum) thought. What is true is that some of the
interior walkways are rather narrow, compared to Dock Street.
Chicago Acorn, 150 F.3d at 703. This decision dimming the significance of open air can be
easily distinguished on other grounds, especially the lack of a thoroughfare.
Notwithstanding, Judge Posner seemingly denies the importance of open air on the
ground that such a factor does not affect the value or cost of speech. The Supreme Court
would undoubtedly reach the opposite conclusion.
144. See supra note 90.
145. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 700
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
146. Even so, the possible disruption of leafleting is low even inside a structure,
because such activity does not trigger as much congestion as face-to-face solicitation. For
this reason, Justice O'Connor, in Lee, was much more willing to uphold the ban on
solicitation than the ban of leafleting. See id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("leafleting does not entail the same kinds of problems presented by face-to-face
solicitation ... it is difficult to point to any problems intrinsic to the act of leafleting that
would make it naturally incompatible with a large, multipurpose forum such as those at
issue here.").
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2. Compatibility with Speech
One of the major assertions of this discussion is that the guiding
factor in forum analysis must be whether speech is compatible with
the purpose of a given piece of property. Or as the Supreme Court
puts it, "[t]he crucial question is whether the manner of expression is
basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at
a particular time." 47 Compatibility is the only rationale that gives
substance to objective physical characteristics.148 If tradition or
physical characteristics are not just labels that the court arbitrarily
selects, then these factors are utilized in determining how compatible
a piece of property is with speech.
This prong of the test must be a balancing test. There can be no
mechanical device for calculating the optimum or minimum level of
expressive activity on certain property. By the same token, such a
balancing test cannot be boundless. Definite factors must guide the
courts or they will remain at sea in their analysis. Besides physical
similarities to other traditional public fora, therefore, the forum's
primary purpose and tradition ought to be considered as well.
a. Forum's Primary Purpose
To determine whether speech is compatible with certain
147. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). See also Ark. Educ.
Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998) ("In the case of streets and parks,
the open access and viewpoint neutrality commanded by the doctrine is 'compatible with
the intended purpose of the property."') (citation omitted); Lee, 505 U.S. at 681 ("And
with each new step, it therefore will be a new inquiry whether the transportation
necessities are compatible with various kinds of expressive activity."); Lee, 505 U.S. at 698
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("If the objective, physical characteristics of the property at
issue and the actual public access and uses that have been permitted by the government
indicate that expressive activity would be appropriate and compatible with those uses, the
property is a public forum."); ACLU of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092,1100 (9th
Cir. 2003) ("Thus, when a property is used for open public access or as a public
thoroughfare, we need not expressly consider the compatibility of expressive activity
because these uses are inherently compatible with such activity."); First Unitarian Church
of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1125 (10th Cir. 2002) ("To
determine the easement's nature and purpose, the question we address is whether
expressive activity is compatible with the purposes and uses to which the government has
lawfully dedicated the property, not whether the government has expressly designated
speech as a purpose of the property.").
148. As one court discerns, "[a] definition that utilizes principles or functional
characteristics to explain a term is often necessary to aid in a more complete
understanding." Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 859 n.6. (N.D. Tex 2004). In
reaching this conclusion, the district court accurately defined traditional public forum as
"government property whose principal function would not be disrupted by expressive
activity." Id. (emphasis in original omitted).
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governmentally owned property, the first necessity is to determine the
purpose of that property and how speech could possibly interfere with
that purpose. For example, the Greer Court made special mention of
the fact that the military serves an important constitutionally
authorized purpose of protecting the country."9 In other words, a
military base cannot effectively serve its important primary function
of protection and training and also serve as a forum for public
expression. The purposes of some facilities and property in light of
the very nature of the property do not lend themselves to public
speech. Certainly, the great importance of national defense combined
with the need for a structure does not lend to public expression in
such an environment. This not true, however, with many
government facilities that can accommodate public speech. For
instance, in open areas in the vicinity of government debates or
hearings, free speech can serve an important function. In some real
sense, these activities go hand in hand in order for the citizens to
petition the government and let their voices be heard."'
Unfortunately, there is no simple formula available to make this
calculation. There are innumerable types of government property,
ranging from military bases to hospitals to athletic stadiums. Each
type presents unique qualities and considerations, and so this inquiry
149. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 837-38 (1976) ("One of the very purposes for which
the Constitution was ordained and established was to 'provide for the common defence,'
and this Court over the years has on countless occasions recognized the special
constitutional function of the military in our national life, a function both explicit and
indispensable. In short, it is 'the prima business of armies and navies to fight or be ready
to fight wars should the occasion arise.' And it is consequently the business of a military
installation like Fort Dix to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum.") (citation and
quotation omitted).
150. Id.
151. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 802 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, parades and demonstrations at or near the seat of
government are often exercises of the right of the people to petition their government for
a redress of grievances--exercises in which the government is the recipient of the message
rather than the messenger."); Warren v. Fairfax County, 196 F.3d 186, 196 (4th Cir. 1999)
("[T]he Center Island is part of a class of property which, by history and tradition, has
been treated as a public forum. It is a part of the grounds of a seat of legislative and
executive power. In general, the grounds ... of state and federal capitol complexes...
have consistently been held to be public fora.") (citation and quotation omitted); Women
Strike for Peace v. Morton, 472 F.2d 1273, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wright, J., concurring)
("[Plarks are much more like state capitol grounds... [they] have long been regarded as a
particular kind of community area that, under the Anglo-American tradition, are
available, at least to some extent and on a reasonable basis, for groups of citizens
concerned with the expression of ideas.") (citation and quotations omitted).
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must be fact specific.1
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b. Tradition
Tradition has always been an essential part of forum analysis.
From the very inception of this doctrine, courts have focused on
history to provide guidance in determining whether an area is a
traditional public forum.153 In fact, some have taken history and
tradition as the determinative factor in forum analysis." Hence, at
least some deference to history is justifiable and should play a part in
forum analysis.' Because forum analysis involves a balancing
152. The purpose of governmental property is to be contrasted with the intent of the
governmental entity, discussed infra. Purpose is discerned by objective matters about the
property, not by an espoused intention.
153. See, e.g., Hague v. Committee of Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)
("[W]herever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such
use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.").
154. Apparently, Justice Scalia is of this opinion. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504
U.S. 191, 213 (1992) (Scalia, J. concurring) ("If the category of 'traditional public forum' is
to be a tool of analysis rather than a conclusory label, it must remain faithful to its name
and derive its content from tradition.") (emphasis in original). There is also some support
from the Court as a whole that tradition is requisite. See United States v. Am. Library
Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003) ("We have rejected the view that traditional public forum
status extends beyond its historic confines. The doctrines surrounding traditional public
forums may not be extended to situations where such history is lacking.") (citation and
quotation omitted). And yet, the precise meaning of "tradition" seems to speak to
characteristics, not specific types of property. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,
178-79 (1983) (holding that although traditionally property itself had not been held open
for use of public, it was a public forum because it belonged to the class of property
historically available for expression); Warren, 196 F.3d at 196. The court has never
precisely stated what those confines are, however. For instance, the court has never
defined the terms "street," "sidewalk," or "park." Nor has the Court strictly limited the
traditional public forum category to streets, sidewalks and parks.
155. But blind reliance on tradition is misplaced. Indeed, Justice Kennedy has spoken
clearly against such blind reliance: "Without this recognition our forum doctrine retains no
relevance in times of fast-changing technology and increasing insularity. In a country where
most citizens travel by automobile, and parks all too often become locales for crime rather
than social intercourse, our failure to recognize the possibility that new types of government
property may be appropriate forums for speech will lead to a serious curtailment of our
expressive activity." International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
697-98 (1992). From a policy perspective, a cursory appeal to tradition will not achieve an
optimum balance between First Amendment principles and other values. By the mere
technological and societal changes that have occurred and will occur, certain areas will
become perfectly compatible with free speech. At the same time, other more traditional
areas will become less effective forums to communicate as people use these forums less. In
order to fully protect a speaker's ability to communicate a message and the general public's
ability to receive a message, forum analysis cannot be frozen in time.
FALL 2005] IF IT LOOKS LIKE A DUCK .. .
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
between First Amendment values and other pragmatic concerns, such
as safety and order, the best indication of the appropriate balance is
actual application in a real time environment. If the controlling factor
in forum analysis is the compatibility of speech with the property
itself, past examples of how certain property interacts with free
speech provide clear and important proof of the costs and benefits of
allowing or forbidding speech in a certain area. In some areas, for
example, the potential hazard of congestion and disruption cannot be
estimated until speakers are allowed in the environment.
Accordingly, many courts still appeal to tradition as one factor in
their forum analysis.5 6
As indicated by its presence of being just one prong, reliance on
tradition serves as only one factor, among many, in forum analysis."7
For tradition to be a useful analytic tool, instead of being a mere
label, it must serve as an evidentiary force providing guidance
towards the issue of compatibility. In itself, history provides no
valuable insights for forum analysis except for clarity. By restricting a
traditional public forum to sidewalks and parks, the Supreme Court
does provide clarity and predictability to its ruling in forum analysis.
However, clarity and predictability must be weighed against accuracy.
By limiting forum analysis to tradition, courts exclude certain forums
that are clearly compatible with public speech yet do not qualify
under traditional definitions.5 8 On the other hand, use of tradition as
a guide, rather than a hinge, to forum analysis mediates between
accuracy and predictability by providing the court more flexibility for
156. See, e.g., ACLU of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1100-01 (9th Cir.
2003) (applying three part test consisting of "1) the actual use and purposes of the
property, particularly status as a public thoroughfare and availability of free public access
to the area; 2) the area's physical characteristics, including its location and the existence of
clear boundaries delimiting the area; and 3) traditional or historic use of both the property
in question and other similar properties...") (citations omitted); First Unitarian Church of
Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1129 (10th Cir. 2002) (considering
physical characteristics of property, its purpose and history of property); Venetian Casino
Resort, L.L.C. v. Local Joint Exec. Bd., 257 F.3d 937, 943-44 (9th Cir. 2001) (considering
fact that sidewalk that was replaced had historically been public forum); Warren, 196 F.3d
at 189-90 (holding that mall area was public forum by applying three-prong test that
included physical characteristics of forum, objective purpose of forum and finally relying
on the fact that "the Center Island mall is part of a class of property which by history and
tradition has been open and used for expressive activity").
157. See, e.g., First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1129 (tradition "is a factor indicating
the property is a public forum, although this is not determinative").
158. A good example of traditional public forum outside of presumptive categories is a
public lawn in front of a government building. Such spaces should always be considered
traditional public fora. See e.g. Accord Parks v. Finan, 385 F.3d 694, 699 (6th Cir. 2004)
(courthouse lawn); Warren, 196 F.3d at 196 (lawn in front of county building).
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fact specific situations. In short, history and tradition's evidentiary
value can still provide predictability without overly constricting forum
analysis. The placement of tradition along side a forum's primary
purpose and alternative forums for speech, best acknowledges
tradition's role as an evidentiary tool. A balancing between these
factors allows courts certain flexibility needed in this difficult arena
while at the same time providing clear guideposts for predictable
results.
E. Effect of Governmental Intent
Status as a traditional public forum is not dependant on will of
government; traditional public fora are open for expressive activity
regardless of governmental intent."' Traditional public fora, like
streets and sidewalks, cannot be transformed to nonpublic fora by
government whim. As a fundamental principle, the government
"may not by its own ipse dixit destroy the 'public forum' status of
streets and parks which have historically been public forums."
'6
Despite this clear precedent, courts, from time to time, ignore
this time-honored premise in relying on government intention for
judging the propriety of speech in a given area. 6' In the end, this
debate depends on what guideline should determine whether
property is compatible with expression: government's intent as
property owner or objective factors. One side defers solely to the
government's decision and therefore analyzes the government's
intention, expressed or otherwise. The better approach assesses a
162property's compatibility with expression in an objective manner.
159. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998).
160. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 133 (1981).
See also Irish Subcomm. of Rhode Island Heritage Comm'n v. Rhode Island Heritage
Comm'n., 646 F. Supp. 347, 353 (D. RI. 1986) (government cannot transform status of
traditional public forum). A well established doctrine, the government cannot be
permitted to "transform the character of the property by the expedient of including it
within the statutory definition of what might be considered a nonpublic forum parcel of
property." Grace, 461 U.S. at 180. "[As] it cannot rightly be said that all such forums are
equal." Mahoney v. Babbit, 105 F.3d 1452, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
161. E.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1099 v. City of Sidney, 364 F.3d
738, 749 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding walkways leading to public school used as polling place
are not public forums because government had not expressed such intent in statutes
establishing polling places); Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union, Local 100 v. City
of N.Y. Dep't of Parks & Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 549 (2d Cir. 2002) (court's decision
ultimately hinged on fact that "the city [had] affirmatively demonstrated intent not to treat
the Plaza as it would a typical city park," despite area's physical similarity to public park).
162. An approach based on government intent is necessarily circular and self-serving.
See Gey, supra note 28 at 1553 ("Once the public forum issue becomes a matter of
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Rather than defer to the government's intent and decision, the court
itself should assess whether a piece of property is compatible with
speech and do so by analyzing the factors enumerated above (physical
characteristics, purpose and nature of property, etc.).
IV. Finding the Traditional on Public College Campus
With these initial considerations, a case can now be made that
open accessible areas on a public college campus ought to be
considered traditional public fora. Essentially, this section will apply
the standard set forth above. Because this standard employs factors
that reflect pertinent Supreme Court jurisprudence, its application
will not only provide an ideal normative argument but also an
argument that is applicable in any circuit court. Before application of
this standard though, as a preface, it should be noted that a college
campus consists of multiple fora and therefore a court ought to
analyze the specific property in question, not the college campus as a
whole, under forum analysis. Such property-specific analysis is
necessary since a college campus, much like a municipality, contains
numerous kinds of property. Therefore, speech in some areas is
appropriate, while speech in other areas may not be. This property-
specific method best preserves the college administration's ability to
educate while acknowledging First Amendment interests. Thus, this
section of the article divides the argument for traditional public forum
on a college campus into two parts: 1) courts should analyze specific
property on a college campus because campuses contain a variety of
fora and 2) certain open areas on a college campus are traditional
public fora because they are physically similar to other traditional
fora, and speech in such areas is compatible with the purpose of
colleges.
A. Determining the Appropriate Forum
Most public universities spread across a large area and contain a
great diversity of property. '63 From a football stadium housing tens of
government intent, the answer is usually going to be the same...").
163. For example, Ohio State University's main campus covers 1,755 acres of land,
including 461 different buildings, "The Oval," a large grassy area with sidewalks used for
studying and recreation, "Mirror Lake Hollow," an area containing the historic "Mirror
Lake," as well as Browning Amphitheater, and Ohio Stadium, where the Ohio State
Buckeyes play football. Available at http://www.osu.edu. The University of Michigan's
three campuses at Ann Arbor, Dearborn, and Flint total 3,177 acres of land, and 315
buildings. The Ann Arbor campus alone includes various outdoor recreational areas,
three different student unions, and many residence halls and academic buildings.
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thousands of persons, to a small classroom or administrative office, a
college campus opens up areas to the public to varying degrees.
Diversity so prevalent, logic demands that a court not label a
university in its entirety as either a public or nonpublic forum. In
order to obtain the optimum balance between free speech and
appropriate governmental control, different types of property within
a college confines should be analyzed and treated differently under
forum analysis. Both Supreme Court and appellate court
jurisprudence require this property-specific approach.
In determining what precise forum to analyze under forum
analysis, the Supreme Court has adopted one simple delineating
principle: the appropriate forum is that where speakers seek to gain
access.' 6' If speakers want access to an entire piece of property, then
that entire piece should be considered for forum analysis. Likewise, if
speakers seek access to a more limited type of forum, then that
limited forum is the appropriate forum for analysis. This speaker-
centric approach to forum determination is enunciated perhaps most
clearly in Cornelius, supra, in which a group attempted to gain access
to an annual charitable fundraising drive conducted in a federal
workplace during work hours .' The Court had to define exactly what
was the forum under consideration, the federal building or the
charitable fundraiser.' 66 In selecting the latter as the appropriate
forum, the Court relied on precedent and explicitly targeted the
access sought by the speaker:
[11n defining the forum we have focused on the access sought by
the speaker. When speakers seek general access to public
property, the forum encompasses that property. In cases in
which limited access is sought, our cases have taken a more
tailored approach to ascertaining the perimeters of a forum
within the confines of the government property. For example,
Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., supra,
examined the access sought by the speaker and defined the
forum as a school's internal mail system and the teachers'
mailboxes, notwithstanding that an "internal mail system" lacks
a physical situs. Similarly, in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,
Available at http://www.umich.edu. The University of Florida sits on an aggregate 2000
acres, with over 900 buildings, of which only approximately 160 hold classrooms and/or
laboratories. The campus includes Lake Alice, a sanctuary for alligators, birds, and bats;
and the Baughman Meditation Center, a structure for private meditation and public
celebration. Available at http://www.ufl.edu.
164. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985)
(".. .[I]n defining the forum we have focused on the access sought by the speaker").
165. Id. at 790-91.
166. Id. at 800-01.
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where petitioners sought to compel the city to permit political
advertising on city-owned buses, the Court treated the
advertising spaces on the buses as the forum. Here, as in Perry
Education Assn., respondents seek access to a particular means
of communication167
This simple formula for defining the relevant forum has guided
past and more recent Supreme Court decisions.
A speaker-centered approach, such as this, carries with it distinct
advantages. First, this approach deals specifically with the issue at bar
and avoids delving into matters not properly before the court. The
only forum that need be identified is the one where a speaker
attempts and is denied access. Moreover, this speaker-centered
approach supplies a clear guidepost that shields the court from
expanding the controversy in question. For this reason, almost all
circuits are in agreement with this principle.69 As these relevant
precedents indicate, courts continually look to the specific property
where speakers seek to gain access rather than property in general. In
Cornelius, the relevant forum was the charitable drive held within a
nonpublic forum of a government building.1 71 In Perry, the court
considered an interior mail system again within the nonpublic forum
167. Id. at 801 (citations omitted).
168. E.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988) ("The relevant forum here may be
easily identified: appellees wish to picket on the public streets of Brookfield."); Lehman v.
City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 301-02 (1974) (analyzing "car card space" and not
public transportation system as whole).
169. See, e.g., United Food and Commercial Workers Local 1099 v. City of Sidney, 364
F.3d 738, 747 (6th Cir. 2004) ("Appellants here were not seeking general access to the
school and private properties involved, but were instead seeking more limited access to
the areas surrounding each of the six polling places."); Summum v. City of Ogden, 297
F.3d 995, 1001-02 (10th Cir. 2002) ("Identification of the relevant forum requires a
nuanced approach that considers (1) the government property to which access is sought
and (2) the type of access sought... Here, the government property at issue is the lawn of
the Ogden City municipal building. The access sought is not merely to converse or post
temporary signs on the lawn, but the right to place permanent monuments on the lawn:
hence the relevant forum is 'permanent monuments on the lawn of the Ogden City
municipal building."'); Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 625 (4th
Cir. 2002) ("The relevant forum is defined by focusing on 'the access sought by the
speaker.' Here, the relevant forum is Virginia's special plate program, consisting of the
special plates authorized and produced under the general rules established by Va. Code
Ann. § 46.2-725. It is to the special plate program that the SCV seek 'access' (here, access
without restrictions on their speech within the forum), and special plates authorized for
other groups and organizations thus provide the relevant context for analyzing the
restriction imposed on the SCV."); Lebron v. AMTRAK, 69 F.3d 650, 661 (2d Cir. 1995)
("The relevant forum must be at least advertising space in the rotunda of Penn Station-
the means of communication to which Lebron sought access.").
170. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801.
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of a building.17' As these cases reveal, courts must focus upon the
specific fora where the speaker attempts access, even if those specific
fora exists within a larger nonpublic or public forum.
Air Line Pilots Ass'n, International v. Department of Aviation,'7 ' a
decision from the Seventh Circuit, is directly on point. In this case, a
group of pilots sought to place an advertisement honoring pilots in
one of the diorama display cases at O'Hare Airport in Chicago.'73
Significantly, the Supreme Court had previously decided that airports
in general are nonpublic fora.74 Yet, in its analysis, the appellate court
first applied the principles espoused in Cornelius and looked to what
forum the speakers attempted to gain access.' Having set forth these
basic principles, the court proceeded to apply them to the specific
controversy regarding the display case in the airport.176  The court
looked to the speaker's intent to define the relevant forum, and, thus
allowed for the possibility that a public forum can exist within a more
general nonpublic forum.1
77
Consistent with the teaching of Cornelius, courts are to analyze
the specific property where the speaker seeks to gain access,
acknowledging that a variety of fora can exist within a singular
governmental property. With this in mind, the specific property
171. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983).
172. 45 F.3d 1144 (7th Cir. 1995).
173. Id. at 1147-48.
174. See also International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679
(1992) (holding airport terminal non-public forum).
175. Air Line Pilots, 45 F.3d at 1148. "The relevant forum is defined by focusing on
'the access sought by the speaker.' If a speaker seeks 'general access' to an entire piece of
public property, then that property is the relevant forum. If a speaker seeks a more
limited access, however, then we must tailor our approach to ascertain 'the perimeters of a
forum within the confines of government property."' Id. at 1151 (citations omitted).
176. Id. at 1151-52. "Here, the ALPA seeks access to a diorama display case. That
organization does not desire to use the greater airport concourse for purposes such as
solicitation and the distribution of literature.... Instead, it wishes only to use one of the
display cases to communicate its message. The limited nature of the ALPA's desired
access renders the display case the relevant forum for the purpose of constitutional
inquiry." Id. (citation omitted).
177. Id. at 1152. Rather than leave this conclusion implicit, the Seventh Circuit goes
on to state that Cornelius demands specific property be analyzed even if that property is
located within a more general type of forum: "Cornelius teaches that forum analysis
involves something more than locating the government's broad property interest. Even
given a conclusion that a piece of government property is not a public forum, channels for
public communication--or alternative fora-may well exist within the greater piece of
government property. This much is true here. Because the ALPA sought access to the
advertising space and not to the airport as a whole, the advertising space is the proper
focus of forum analysis." Id. (citations omitted).
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sought by a speaker on a college campus ought to be analyzed for
forum status rather than the college campus as a whole. On one scale,
small classrooms and administrative buildings are open only to
certain students and administrators, because these areas have certain
goals that cannot be achieved in the presence of public access. But on
the other end of the spectrum, roads, large parks, and gathering areas
often litter and run throughout a college campus. The public has
continual access to these open areas at all times, and in fact, the
university encourages individuals to gather and relax in the open air.
Somewhere in the middle, there exists areas like cafeterias,
auditoriums, and athletic fields where the school allows some public
access and encourages some public expression, but also limits other
forms of expression. Much like a small city, college campuses cater to
a variety of pursuits including education, relaxation, athletic
completion, and commercial business, among others. Along this line,
a judge in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals makes an astute
observation, commenting on the inherent variety within public
college campuses:
A campus of a major state university is a microcosm of the
community, and, as such, contains a variety of fora. Some places
on campus, such as the administration building or the
president's office, are not opened as fora for use by the student
body, and may be best described as nonpublic fora. Other
places on campus, such as the residence halls and fraternity and
sorority houses, have been created to allow student expression,
but remain limited for use by certain groups or for the
discussion of certain subjects; these places may be best
described as limited public fora. Other places on campus, such
as the campus student union, streets, sidewalks, and park-like
areas, are freely used for student expression. These areas are
best described as traditional public fora.... 178
The logic is undeniable. 179 Given this great diversity, in terms of
178. Ala. Student Party v. Student Gov't Ass'n, 867 F.2d 1344, 1354 n.6 (11th Cir.
1989) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). In Alabama Student Party, students sued a student
government association, claiming that restrictions on election campaigning violated
constitutional rights to free speech. Id. at 1345. The majority held that the proper analysis
centers on the level of control a university may exert over the school-related activities of
its students. Id. at 1347. Under such reasoning, the court found the narrow restrictions in
this case reasonable given the university's interest in education and minimizing the
disruptive effects of campus campaigning. Id. Thus, the ruling in no way disputes Judge
Tjoflat's analysis of multiple fora on a college campus. See Davis, supra note 6 at 271 n. 28
(citing Judge Tjoflat for proposition that college campus contains variety of fora).
179. Rod Smolla, Dean of Richmond School of Law, and renowned scholar on free
speech, concurs. See Rodney Smolla, Academic Freedom, Hate Speech, and the Idea of a
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the nature and purpose of property on campuses, there are a variety
of different kinds of fora within a college campus."s In applying the
speaker-intent principle to define the relevant forum, courts review
the specific parcel of campus property where a given speaker seeks to
gain access, not the general campus as a whole. Just as a federal
building and an airport can contain a diversity of fora,'8 ' then a
campus spreading over numerous acres, containing buildings and
fields and areas for multiple purposes, should be similarly broken
down into a variety of fora for forum analysis.
Policy considerations also support this forum analysis. In fact, the
only way to avoid either massive under-protection or over-protection
of free speech is to adopt a property specific analysis. Certain areas
on a college campus often contain traditional public fora. City streets,
for example, frequently pass through the middle of large public
universities. College administrators cannot close down such areas
from outside use for any or every reason. And the allowance for
speech in such areas in no way hinders the university from achieving
its educational purpose. Obviously, a school must maintain peace and
order in certain areas to effectively achieve the educational purpose
of the university. Areas, such as classrooms, must necessarily be
restricted in order to create a conducive learning environment.
Nevertheless, the best way to balance the competing values involved
is to analyze different types of property found on a college campus
differently. Under this flexible and more reasonable approach, courts
can craft a policy that achieves the optimum balance between First
Amendment values and important, legitimate goals of the
university.
University, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 218 (1990) ("The soundest view is to treat
campus not as one unified forum, but as subdivided into multiple forums to which
different free speech standards apply").
180. See also Langhauser, supra note 6, a recent article written by General Counsel for
Maine Community College Systems, and copyrighted by National Association of College
and University Attorneys, discussing the forum status of different areas on public college
campuses. In the body of this article, Mr. Langhover engages in forum analysis, and
specifically acknowledges the existence of traditional public fora, among other fora, on
public college campuses. Id. at 497, 512.
181. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 693 (saying "airport corridors and shopping areas outside of
the passenger security zones" are public forums); Grace, 461 U.S. at 178-79 (noting the
courthouse is made up of various forums).
182. Because accessible areas on college campus, like other public sidewalks and parks,
are open to the public and are public thoroughfares, the cost of allowing speech in such
areas is low. The possibility of interference or disruptions is slight due to the physical
qualities of such areas (openness). Moreover, the cost of preventing such speech is
extraordinarily high because numerous people travel in those areas, and these areas
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This balanced approach has been recognized within the realm of
hospitals. Hospital grounds are similar to college campuses in that the
former contains property of varying character from an emergency
room to an outdoor parking lot. In Dallas Ass'n of Community
Organizations for Reform Now v. Dallas,1" the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a hospital could not prevent all solicitation on all of
its property.' Rather than take a blanket approach, the court took a
reasoned stance and avoided labeling all of the hospital grounds as
one type of forum:
Our concern in the present controversy has been and remains the
necessity of preventing disruptive activity in the crowded front lobby
of Parkland, the waiting room, the outpatient clinic, and the
emergency treatment area, as well as any other area for patient
treatment. However, we also recognize that Parkland's premises
cover 23 acres, including over 1,000 feet of sidewalks and several
large parking lots. Thus we must attempt to find the middle way
between absolute prohibition of free speech activities in a limited
public forum, and disruptive expressions that interfere with the
purpose, function and administration of a hospital.1"
Such reasoning applies equally to a college campus. Like large
hospitals, college campuses often contain various kinds of property
over many acres including sidewalks and parks. The imposition of a
blanket rule on the totality of either hospital or college grounds
ignores the inherent diversity within those areas. In the same way that
an emergency room is not the proper place for expressive activities, a
classroom setting does not allow for any and all forms of speech.
However, a sidewalk on either hospital or campus grounds can easily
accommodate free speech with no detrimental impact on the uses of
the college or hospital.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia adopted a
similar analysis in judging certain sidewalks at the Vietnam War
represent one of the few places that speakers can reach college audiences. If a court labels
an entire campus as a nonpublic forum, then these areas so conducive to free speech will
lie fallow and underused. The student body will suffer since they will not be exposed to
various ideas. Additionally, the speakers who attempt to convey a message will suffer
since they will bear a needless burden. The potential costs for all parties concerned are
great. On the other hand, courts should and could not brand an entire campus as a
traditional public forum.
183. 670 F.2d 629 (Former 5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1052 (1982).
184. Id. at 631.
185. Id.
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Memorial as traditional public forums in Henderson v. Lujan.1 "
Therein, the court distinguished between sidewalks and "curvilinear
paths leading to the Memorial wall; their evidently more specialized
use may outweigh the attributes that would otherwise mark them as
public forums.""t Rather than take the Vietnam War Memorial as a
whole and labeling all property thereon as a public forum merely
because the government owned the Memorial, the court analyzed the
specialized purpose and nature of specific property within that
Memorial."
College campuses, memorial parks, hospital grounds, and like
venues cover significant space and contain a diversity of kinds of
property. An all-encompassing blanket analysis of a college campus
refuses to recognize this blatant fact, and thereby, excessively
undervalues either First Amendment values or the policy goals of the
university.
Such values and goals can be achieved generally as long as courts
adopt clear objective criteria to determine the nature of a forum.1 9
The employment of objective criteria - physical similarity and the
compatibility of speech with the property - inevitably permits the
various types of property found on the college campuses to fulfill
their respective purposes at all times with clarity that would naturally
flow for those purposes.
B. Open areas of university property are traditional public fora
The rationale and precedent for defining a traditional public
forum have already been set forth previously in this article. The same
rationale applies in the university context. To a large extent, objective
and physical characteristics dictate the analysis regardless of location.
While property may vary to the extent that it is open to the public or
is a thoroughfare, these concerns are not tied to such being found on
a college campus.
Other factors that implicate whether property is compatible with
speech do present unique variables in a college environment,
however. Therefore, this section will assume that the college property
186. 964 F.2d 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1992.
187. Id. at 1182.
188. Id.
189. Indeed, deference to the subjective intent of the government creates an untenable
situation. While the government retains the power to plan and control the property as
they desire, speakers are left at the mercy of the government and thus are often unaware if
they can or cannot speak.
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in consideration satisfies an initial barrier of physical characteristics,"9
and proceed to analyze certain factors pertaining to compatibility.
The primary purpose of a university or college is generally
compatible with expressive speech activity. On its face, universities
serve to educate those students who attend, and such higher
education best flourishes in an environment of various ideas. There
can be little doubt that many ideas and theories have once been
relegated to minority or disfavored status, but through free and open
debate on college campuses, gained greater acceptance. 9'
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has explicitly emphasized that
colleges and universities are locations where free speech must receive
protections against governmental restriction." Lower courts have
followed this lead. 193
190. A barrier that is easily cleared on a typical college campus. See, e.g., Students
Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil, 660 F. Supp. 333, 338 (W.D. Va. 1987) (holding
that lawn on college campus is public forum because of similarity to municipal park).
191. As Derek Langhover, General Counsel for Maine Community College System,
notes in his article, "the culture of free ideological exchange is deeply imbedded in the
collegiate setting." Langhover, supra note 6, at 482-83.
192. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) ("We have long recognized
that, given the important purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of
speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities occupy a
special niche in our constitutional tradition."); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268
(1981) ("Moreover, the capacity of a group or individual to participate in the intellectual
give and take of campus debate... [would be] limited by denial of access to the customary
media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students.");
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) ("[S]tate colleges and universities are not
enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment."); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("The classroom is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas.
The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust
exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than
through any kind of authoritative selection.") (quotation marks and citation omitted);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) ("The vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools."); Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) ("Teachers and students must always remain
free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding;
otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die."); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) ("The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the
States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures - Boards of
Education not excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly
discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of
Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous
protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free
mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as
mere platitudes.").
193. See, e.g., Auburn Alliance for Peace and Justice v. Martin, 684 F. Supp. 1072, 1076
(M.D. Ala. 1988) ("[T]his Court can think of no place that should be more hospitable to
the free expression of ideas than the campus of a great university").
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Of course, the importance of maintaining an environment of free
expression on a college campus does not mean an administration is
required to refrain from regulating speech on its campus.19 But any
such restriction must be appropriate in light of the purpose of a given
piece of property. While some areas on a college campus are not
compatible with free public expression, speech in other areas does not
interfere with the educative purpose of the university. In these areas -
spaces that are compatible with expression - courts should allow as
much free speech as possible in order to ensure an environment
where no authoritarian party, even the university administration, can
suppress speech because of its content. Higher academia's
compatibility with speech easily differs from that of a military
purpose or even a medical purpose. If free speech is allowed to roam
in certain areas of a hospital complex, 95 then surely free speech
should be allowed within a college campus whose sole purpose is to
expose students to new ideas. The very educational purpose of the
university supports the allowance of free speech and the free
discussion of ideas. Freedom of speech, thusly, is an essential
component of a conducive learning environment. And precisely
because of the unique nature of the college environment, and the
important speech interests involved, protection of speech must be
given considerable weight in the university environment.1 96
Directly tied to this recognition of the great value of free speech
in a university setting is the parallel notion that such importance is
founded on history and tradition. As soon as the university had its
inception, it has served as the leading edge for many ideas unpopular
in other areas of society.'" This historical significance of free speech
194. Even in a traditional public forum, time, place, and manner regulations are
suitable. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 268 ("First Amendment rights must be analyzed in light
of the special characteristics of the school environment. We continue to adhere to that
view. A university differs in significant respects from public forums such as streets or parks
or even municipal theaters. A university's mission is education, and decisions of this Court
have never denied a university's authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible
with that mission upon the use of its campus and facilities.") (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
195. Dallas Ass'n., 670 F.2d at 632.
196. This concept is understood in the university community. Mr. Langhover, counsel
for a public university system, makes this initial observation in his article: "With their
essential purpose being to inspire the exchange of new and challenging ideas, public
colleges and universities are precisely the type of marketplaces that the Framers had in
mind when they committed the nation to protecting both the process and the product of
free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Langhover, supra note 6, at
481.
197. See generally Jeffrey S. Strauss, Dangerous Thoughts?: Academic Freedom, Free
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on a college campus was recognized by the Supreme Court in
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,'" a case
in which the university administration refused to pay a third-party
contractor for the printing costs of a student publication.'" Justice
Kennedy, speaking for the Court, struck down such refusal and based
his analysis partly on the historic place of free speech in a university
200setting.
Thus, Rosenberger stands for the clear proposition that campuses
are an area historically devoted to and dependant on the free
expression of ideas. When the historic record is combined with the
general compatibility of a university with free speech, a great weight
is placed on a court to analyze a specific piece of property on a
college campus. These general factors do not make every kind of
property on campus a traditional public forum per se, but they do
support the endorsement of traditional public fora on campus that
demonstrate compatibility with public expression. 0'
Speech, and Censorship Revisited in a Post-September Il' America, 15 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 343, 351 (2004) (arguing that "marketplace of ideas" contemplates views that
modify or reject traditional beliefs).
198. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
199. Id. at 827.
200. Justice Kennedy elaborates:
Vital First Amendment speech principles are at stake here... [including] the
chilling of individual thought and expression. That danger is especially real
in the University setting, where the State acts against a background and
tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual
and philosophic tradition. In ancient Athens, and, as Europe entered into a
new period of intellectual awakening, in places like Bologna, Oxford, and
Paris, universities began as voluntary and spontaneous assemblages or
concourses for students to speak and to write and to learn. The quality and
creative power of student intellectual life to this day remains a vital measure
of a school's influence and attainment. For the University, by regulation, to
cast disapproval on particular viewpoints of its students risks the suppression
of free speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers for the Nation's
intellectual life, its college and university campuses."
Id. at 835-36 (citations omitted). See Davis, supra note 6, at 275 (author concludes that
historical background of American public university, as described by Justice Kennedy,
serves as prerequisite to recognition of traditional public forum).
201. See Juliane N. McDonald, Brister v. Faulkner and the Clash of Free Speech and
Good Order on the College Campus, 28 J.C. & U.L. 467, 491 (2002) (opines that Supreme
Court's recognition of importance of free speech on open areas of public universities
makes such areas "prototypical" public forums).
[Vol. 33:1
V. Standing Up for the Traditional
A final stumbling block to any argument for traditional public
fora on a public college campus comes from Widmar v. Vincent.'°2
Perhaps, more than any other, university administrators cling to this
particular case as justification for extensive power to control free
speech on a college campus.03 Accordingly, any objections stemming
from Widmar must play a significant role in forum analysis litigation
within the college setting.
Despite the frequency that college administrators rely on
Widmar, this reliance is terribly misplaced. Widmar cannot be
understood (at least not properly) to deny the presence of traditional
public fora on a university campus. To the contrary, a proper reading
of Widmar represents a precedent for, not a stumbling block against,
robust free speech on open areas of a college campus. The case
requires the recognition of all types of fora within a university setting.
In Widmar, university students belonging to a religious group
were informed by the University of Missouri at Kansas City officials
that they could no longer meet in university buildings.2 O The Court
held that the university inappropriately discriminated against student
groups based on their desire to use a generally open forum to engage
in religious worship and discussion. 5 Because the student group was
religious in nature, much of the Court's analysis discussed the
establishment clause.2 6 Nevertheless, the Court did speak to the
question of the appropriate forum label within the university
setting.'
Some have taken the language and analysis of Widmar to stand
for the proposition that no area on a college campus is a traditional
public forum."l However, Widmar does not adopt this narrow
202. Widmar, 454 U.S. 263.
203. Favored language extrapolated from Widmar includes the quote, "First
Amendment rights must be analyzed in 'light of the special characteristics of the school
environment'... A university's mission is education, and decisions of this Court have
never denied a university's authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with
that mission upon the use of its campus and facilities." Id. at 268 n.5 (citation omitted).
204. Id. at 265.
205. Id. at 277.
206. Id. at 271-76.
207. Id. at 269-70.
208. Such wayward thought includes the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Mote, 423 F.3d 438. Citing Widmar, the appellate court dismissed out of hand that the
outside areas on campus could be deemed traditional public fora. Id. at 444. This same
distorted reasoning was applied by a district court in Texas. See Bourgault, 316 F. Supp.
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approach. Far from it, the language of Widmar acknowledges that
some areas on a public university campus are a traditional public
forum. The relevant language from Widmar comes from dictum in a
footnote:
A university differs in significant respects from public forums
such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A
university's mission is education, and decisions of this Court
have never denied a university's authority to impose reasonable
regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of its
campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a
campus must make all of its facilities equally available to
students and nonstudents alike, or that a university must grant
free access to all of its grounds or buildings.2 9
From this dictum, an argument has been pursued that no public
forum exists on a public university campus. Yet, this is not what the
Court has said. As the emphasized words in the above quote clarify,
Justice Powell understands that the Supreme Court has refused to
open up "all" areas of a college campus as a public forum. But by
employing such verbiage, the Supreme Court also explicitly refuses to
label an entire campus as one type of forum, acknowledging a variety
of fora on the grounds. Thus, by strong implication, the Court notes
that some (but not "all") of the fora must "grant free access" and be
"equally available to students and nonstudents alike." 210
Further, authorities clarifying the import of Widmar point
toward the more sensible reading of the case. In Students Against
Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil, for example, the court specifically cited
Widmar to support the fact that a certain area on campus is a public
forum. 1 Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has also
been unwilling to label an entire campus as a nonpublic forum.
Instead, in Brister v. Faulkner,212 the Fifth Circuit analyzed the specific
venue in question and its characteristics to determine that a sidewalk
2d at 419 (interprets Widmar as supporting assertion that no portion of public university
campus can qualify as traditional public forum).
209. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 268 n.5 (emphasis added).
210. Id.
211. O'Neil, 660 F. Supp. at 338. The Court remarks, "Mindful of... the similarity
between an open campus lawn and a traditional public forum like municipal parks,
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n. 5 (1981), the court will examine the defendant's
regulations in light of the cases that concern attempts to regulate speech in public places."
Id.
212. 214 F.3d 675 (5h Cir. 2000).
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on university property classifies as a traditional public forum."3
Thus, as these cases demonstrate, courts have been unwilling
impose a blanket rule that all parts of college campuses are nonpublic
fora.214 Consequently, these cases likewise demonstrate the refusal of
courts to read Widmar in such a way as to limit fora on campus to
nonpublic and limited public forums. Instead, courts often analyze the
specific property in question in regards to its purpose and nature to
make its forum determination accordingly. Within that analysis,
Widmar can only stand for the proposition that some areas on a
college campus are traditional public fora. Thus, school
administrators are unable to rely on Widmar as justification for
extreme discretion over the allowance of speech on an entire college
campus. Such justification does not fit with the language of Widmar
itself or subsequent judicial understandings of that case.
VI. Conclusion
Truly, "protecting the free exchange of ideas within our schools
is of profound importance in promoting an open society. '215 For this
reason, the university environment, with its focus on learning and
knowledge, should serve as bastion par excellence for freedom of
speech and expression. Allowance of free speech within the open and
accessible areas on campus does not threaten the effectiveness of the
university; quite the opposite, it ensures the exposure of students and
faculty to a diversity of ideas. If speech is subject to restriction on
campus, forum analysis cannot be used to rubberstamp decisions of
the university as regulator. Rather - the courts as protectors of the
First Amendment - must make forum analysis depend on certain
objective characteristics instead of governmental intent. In merely
acknowledging the obvious, open accessible areas that look like
traditional public fora, act like traditional public fora, and function
like traditional public fora, must be considered traditional public fora.
Neither government in the form of an external entity nor university
administration ought to be empowered to restrict speech in such
venues unless it is deemed necessary to fulfill the educative purpose
of the university. Just like one should recognize a duck as a duck,
proper forum analysis demands the recognition of open areas of a
college campus as traditional public fora.
213. Id. at 682-83.
214. See discussion supra, regarding variety of fora on public college campus.
215. Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 296 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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